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Abstract
The objective of this study is to analyze and characterize equilibrium in a labor market
where rms post wage contract oers and workers - both employed and unemployed -
search for better paid job opportunities. Given the environment faced, it is shown that
in equilibrium the contract oered by a rm to any employee implies the worker’s wage
increases with tenure at that rm. Further, although dierent rms oer dierent
contracts, in equilibrium all contracts can be related to a single wage/tenure contract
with dierent starting points. The results lead to several predictions about the labor
market histories of workers and the nature of labor market equilibria that have not
been exploited to date.
The objective of this study is to analyze and characterize equilibrium in a labor
market where rms post wage contract oers and workers - both employed and un-
employed - search for better paid job opportunities. Given the environment faced, it
is shown that in equilibrium the contract oered by a rm to any employee implies
the worker’s wage increases with tenure at that rm. Further, although dierent
rms oer dierent contracts, in equilibrium all contracts can be related to a single
wage/tenure contract with dierent starting points. The results lead to several pre-
dictions about the labor market histories of workers and the nature of labor market
equilibria that have not been exploited to date.
During the last ten years or so a literature has developed based on the equilibrium
analysis of labor markets where employed workers continue search for better job
opportunities. This has led to signicant theoretical and empirical insights which
have deepened our understanding of how real world markets work (see, Van den Berg
(1999) for a survey). Much of this work has been based on the framework developed
by Burdett and Mortensen (1989,1998) (hereafter termed B/M).1
A critical feature of the B/M framework is that each rm posts a single price -
a wage which it pays all of its employees at every point in time. In the context of a
relatively standard matching framework with identical rms and workers, equilibrium
with on-the-job search implies a non-degenerate distribution of wage oers. The logic
is relatively simple. Firms oering a high wage make less prot per employee than
those rms oering a lower wage. On-the-job search, however, implies those rms
oering higher wages attract more workers and so enjoy a larger steady-state labor
force. In equilibrium, all rms obtain the same steady-state prot flow, even though
they oer dierent wages.
The objective is to extend the B/M framework to equilibria where rms do not
post a single wage, but post wage contracts. These contracts specify the wage paid
to any employee as a function of that worker’s tenure at the rm. It will be shown
that in equilibrium each rm oers a wage/tenure contract that imply an employee’s
wage increases smoothly with tenure. As with the B/M study, the market equilibrium
is characterized by wage dispersion in that there is a non-degenerate distribution of
1An alternative approach, developed by Burdett and Judd (1983), has recently been investigated
by Acemoglu and Shimmer (1997).
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wage/tenure contracts oered by rms. There is wage dispersion within a rm due to
dierent tenures as well as across the market when controlling for tenure. This leads
to new and testable predictions about the nature of markets.
Three restrictions play a critical role in obtaining these results. First, as is common
in labor market modelling, we assume there is an imperfect capital market where
workers cannot borrow against future earnings. Second, workers are assumed to be
risk averse. Third, each rm is assumed not to respond to outside oers received by
any of its employees. The rst two restrictions are relatively standard, the third is
not. Clearly, this latter restriction is not satised in some labor markets such as the
academic labor market in the U.S.. Nevertheless, there are several reasons to suspect
our restriction holds in other labor markets, especially those market where workers
are homogenous. First, outside oers may not be observable (or veriable) by rms.
Indeed, why should a rm verify to another rm that it has made a particular oer
to a worker? Of course, given oers from other rms are not veriable, they will be
ignored. Second, as we assume throughout that all workers are equally productive,
some employees may well become disgruntled should a no more talented and more
junior employee receive a higher wage on the basis of some random outside oer.
Third, as we know in bargaining theory, it is best to have all the bargaining power.
By precommiting to a xed company wage policy, the rm refuses to bargain with
employees over their search rents.
In contrast, suppose a rm does respond to an oer received by one of its workers.
How would this process then proceed? Clearly, several alternative modelling restric-
tions can be made. In an insightful study Robin and Postel-Visnay (2001) propose
that the two rms - the worker’s current employer and the rm that made the new
oer - enter into a Bertrand pricing game. In such a case with identical rms, both
rms oer a wage equal to the worker’s marginal product. The worker then stays at
his or her current employer but yields no further prot to the rm. In addition, the
rm making the ‘veriable’ outside oer makes no prot.
The basic structure considered here is that a rm precommits to a xed com-
pany wage policy where, with identical workers, the wage paid depends only on the
worker’s current tenure (or seniority). The rm realises that its employees will receive
alternative (non-veriable) job oers from time to time and will quit if a preferred
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oer is received. A primary issue is what form does the rm’s optimal wage contract
take?
It turns out there are two basic forces at work. First, there is an incentive eect
where a rm prefers to backload wages in any wage/tenure prole. By oering a
worker a smaller wage today but a greater wage at some future date, a rm reduces
its current wage bill and also increases an employee’s expected return to staying with
the rm. This, in turn, reduces the probability the worker quits to a preferred job
contact. Second, there is an insurance eect. As workers cannot borrow against future
earnings then, ceteris paribus, each risk averse worker prefers a wage/tenure contract
which implies a constant wage per period. An optimal contract trades o these two
competing eects and implies wages rise smoothly with tenure, limiting to a wage
which is strictly less than marginal product.
The above result is of course a partial - about how a given rm behaves in a
particular environment. Later in this study we show that such behavior is consistent
with a steady-state market equilibrium. At such an equilibrium each rm oers an
optimal wage/tenure contract given its correct beliefs about the contracts oered by
other rms and the behavior of workers. Further, workers utilize their best search
strategy.
An important element of our results is that the equilibrium identied can be
characterized by a baseline salary scale. A baseline salary scale is the equilibrium
wage/tenure prole of a rm oering the lowest initial wage to those it employs. It
is shown that any other rm’s wage tenure prole can be described by the baseline
salary scale with a dierent starting point. For example, suppose a rm oers a
starting wage that is the same as the baseline salary at (say) 7 months tenure. An
optimal contract implies employees at this rm are paid a wage after 3 months equal
to the wage paid at 10 months according to the baseline salary scale. And so on.
This, of course, leads to a strong testable restriction on possible wage/tenure proles
oered by rms.
In equilibrium, wage dispersion arises for three reasons. First, dierent unem-
ployed workers obtain dierent acceptable job oers - some are lucky and obtain a
job with a high initial wage, others are not. Second, a worker’s wage at a particular
rm increases with tenure according to the baseline salary scale. Finally, on-the-job
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search implies a worker will change job if a more valuable contract oer is received.
A particularly convenient result for applied work is that equilibrium also implies
that an employee’s current wage is a sucient statistic describing that worker’s con-
temporaneous quit rate. Of course when receiving an outside oer, a worker considers
the relative value of accepting the alternative job oer, which depends on expected
future wages at the respective rms. But the baseline salary scale property implies
a worker will quit if and only if the initial wage oered at the new rm is strictly
greater than the worker’s current wage.
A closely related paper is Stevens (2000) who assumes risk neutral workers. When
workers are indierent to risk, there is no reason to smooth payments with tenure.
The optimal wage contract is then a step contract where a zero wage is paid until
some nite tenure date, after which the worker is paid marginal product. A surprising
feature is that a market equilibrium then implies all rms oer the same step contract,
and this degenerate outcome then implies no quit turnover.
In the next Section we specify the basic elements of the model. As the derivation
of the results is not trivial, things are kept reasonably simple. After briefly describing
the optimal quit behavior of workers, we rst derive the optimal contract a rm oers
within a particular matching environment. We then construct a market equilibrium
using a two-step procedure. Given the assumed search behavior of workers, we rst
describe a non-cooperative wage contract posting game played by rms. Given the
equilibrium to that game, we then identify a market equilibrium where the assumed
search behavior of workers is indeed optimal (given rm behaviour). Finally the
implications of our results are discussed.
1 Basic Framework
Although the major results of this study are presented within the context of a contin-
uous time model, for the present assume that time can be divided into small discrete
intervals dt > 0:
Suppose a unit mass of workers and rms participate in a labor market. Workers
and rms are assumed to be homogeneous such that any rm generates revenue pdt
for each worker it employs in interval dt: Both unemployed and employed workers
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obtain new job oers from time to time. Let dt denote the probability a new job
oer is received by a worker at the end of interval dt. Any job oer is fully described
by the wage contract oered by the rm. Such a contract species the wage the
worker receives as a function of his or her tenure at that rm. As employees are
identical, anti-discrimination legislation requires that a rm oers all new hires the
same contract.
An unemployed worker becomes employed on receiving a job oer that yields an
expected return at least as great as unemployment, whereas an employed worker
changes employer on receiving an oer that yields a strictly greater expected return
than remaining with his or her current employer.
Employed workers continue to work and receive new oers until they die. Let
dt denote the probability any worker dies (leaves the market for good) in interval
dt: Such workers are instantly replaced by new unemployed workers. Unemployed
workers obtain bdt unemployment insurance payment in interval dt:
2 The Workers
All we need to know about the rms at present is that each rm is assumed to post
a contract bw = fw()g1=0; where w()dt species the amount it pays any employee
with tenure  for the following period dt:
As stated previously, we assume throughout that the worker cannot borrow against
future earnings. As wages will be monotonically increasing with age, it will not be
optimal for workers to save for future consumption. Hence we assume workers are
always liquidity constrained. The worker maximizes expected lifetime utility, where
given the worker consumes income wdt in period t; the worker obtains one period
utility u(w)dt: Assume u is strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice dierentiable
and
lim
w!0+
u(w) = −1: (1)
Note these restrictions are consistent with utility functions which have constant rela-
tive risk aversion u(x) = x1−=[1−] with parameter   1:2 Aside from their death
rate  > 0; assume workers do not discount the future.
2this assumption ensures that the corner constraint w  0 is never binding.
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Any job oer received is assumed to be the realization of a random draw from F;
where F (V ) is the probability any contract oered yields an expected lifetime utility
no greater than V if it is accepted. Let [V ; V ] denote its support.
Given a worker with tenure t is employed by a rm oering contract bw, let V (t; bw)
denote the worker’s expected lifetime payo when using an optimal quit strategy.
Similarly, let Vu denote an unemployed worker’s expected lifetime payo. For now,
take Vu as given.
Given any contract bw and any tenure t where V (t + dt; bw)  Vu; the Bellman
equation implies
V (t; bw) = u(w(t))dt+ (1− dt)[(1− dt)V (t+ dt; bw)
+dtF (V (t + dt; bw)V (t+ dt; bw) + dt Z V
V (t+dt; bw) xdF (x)] (2)
where the interpretation is standard - the worker quits to another rm if an outside
oer is received whose value x exceeds V (t+ dt; bw):
Of course given some arbitrary contract bw; it may happen that V (t+ dt; bw) < Vu
for some t: In that case the worker quits to unemployment at the end of the period
and so
V (t; bw) = u(w(t))dt+ (1− dt)[(1− dt)Vu + dtF (Vu)Vu + dt Z V
Vu
xdF (x)]:
Dene T (bw) = minft  0 : V (t; bw) < Vug which is the tenure date at which the
worker quits to unemployment. If no such tenure date exists, then set T ( bw) = 1.
From (2) it can be seen that V (:; bw) satises the dierence equation
V (t; bw)
1− dt −
V (t+ dt; bw)− V (t; bw)
dt
(3)
=
u(w(t))
1− dt + 
Z V
V (t+dt; bw)[x− V (t+ dt; bw)]dF (x);
while V (t + dt; bw)  Vu; and the boundary condition V (T ; bw) = Vu if T <1:
Consider an employee at a rm oering contract bw: At any tenure t where t+dt <
T (bw); then ( + (1− F (V (t+ dt; bw))dt+ o(dt) is the probability he or she leaves at
the end of the period: Hence for dt arbitrarily small and for any t such that t < T (bw);
 (t; bw) = e− R t0 [+(1−F (V (s; bw))]ds
is the probability an employee does not leave before tenure t: The next section con-
siders a rm’s optimal wage contract bw; given this quit strategy:
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3 The Firms
The objective in this Section is to derive the contract that maximizes a rm’s expected
prot given it yields an expected lifetime utility of at least Vp to any new worker who
accepts it. Such a contract is termed an optimal contract. It is shown that there are
two forces which determine the nature of this contract. First, as capital markets are
imperfect, there is an insurance problem where, ceteris paribus, risk averse workers
prefer a constant wage stream. The insurance eect implies workers value a smoother
wage stream more highly. Second, there is a moral hazard problem where an employee
quits if a better outside oer is received.
When designing an optimal contract, each rm takes as given (a) F; the distribu-
tion of contracts oered by other rms in the market, (b) Vu; the expected lifetime
utility of an unemployed worker, and (c) the quit strategy of an employed worker
given the contract oered .
We start by making two preliminary points. First, as the arrival rate of further
job oers is independent of a worker’s state, an unemployed worker accepts a contract
which oers w(t) = b for all t: As b < p by assumption, a rm can always obtain
strictly positive prot by oering this contract. Hence, the following only considers
situations where rms make strictly positive prot.
Second, note that a rm which oers a contract that yields an expected lifetime
utility Vp to a worker, where Vp < Vu; hires no workers. As such a contract makes
zero prot, strictly positive prot therefore requires that each rm oers a Vp  Vu:
As F describes the distribution of contract oers in the market, we only consider
situations where V  Vu; i.e. the lowest value wage contract oered in the market
has value at least as great as Vu:
The distribution of outside oers faced by workers plays a central role in what
follows. We construct an equilibrium where F has the following properties.
A1: (a) V < u(p)=; and (b) for all V 2 (V ; V ); F is continuously dierentiable and
satises F 0(V ) > 0:
Note, A1(a) must hold, otherwise V  u(p)= would require that some rms oer
contracts which make negative prots. The second assumption, A1(b), is more di-
cult to justify at this stage. This restriction and potential alternatives are discussed
later.
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Fix an F satisfying A1, and a Vu satisfying Vu  V : In equilibrium both F and Vu
are endogenously determined, but each rm takes these objects as given. Given such
a Vu and F; suppose the rm oers a starting wage contract that yields an expected
utility Vp to any worker it hires.
Clearly Vp < Vu implies this contract does not attract any workers, and so consider
Vp satisfying Vp  Vu: Suppose the rm utilizes contract bw: Assuming rms do not
discount the future, then for dt arbitrarily small the rm’s expected return to hiring
a worker is Z T ( bw)
0
 (t; bw)[p− w(t)]dt;
where  (t; bw) and T (bw) are dened in the previous section. Of course if T (bw) <1;
the worker quits at tenure T (bw) and the rm makes no further prot from this hire.
Hence given the worker’s optimal quit strategy, the rm’s formal optimal con-
tracting problem (for dt arbitrarily small) can be written as
maxbw
Z T ( bw)
0
 (t; bw)[p− w(t)]dt (4)
subject to
V (0; bw)  Vp (5)
The rst result is immediate.
Claim 1. Fix an F satisfying A1 and a Vu  V : If Vp  V and dt > 0; the optimal
wage contract implies w(t) = wp for all t where u(wp) = Vp; and an employee never
quits.
Proof : Fix any Vp  V . Now consider the wage contract bw  fw(t) = wpg1t=0 where
wp is dened in the Claim: The Bellman equation (3) implies V (t; bw) = Vp for all
t; where Vp  V implies the worker never quits. As this contract is jointly ecient
and also extracts maximal employee rents (given Vp) it therefore maximizes the rm’s
prot.
As it plays a most important role in what follows, dene w where
u(w) = V :
Claim 1 establishes that a rm which oers the contract that yields the greatest
lifetime utility to new hires (i.e. sets Vp = V ); provides perfect income insurance - it
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oers a constant wage w(t) = w for all t. As an employee never quits at such a rm,
the rm’s expected prot  per hire is
 = [p− w]=:
Note that A1(a) implies w < p and  > 0.
We now turn to a rm that oers a contract which yields Vp; where V  Vp < V :
Such a rm faces a positive risk that its employee quits to competing rms. What
follows establishes that in the optimal contract, a rm will gradually increase wage
payments with tenure.
The necessary conditions describing the optimal wage contract are derived in
Appendix A. Here we simply describe the solution for the limiting case where dt! 0.
Given Vp; let w
 = fw( jVp)g1=0 denote the rm’s optimal contract. Let V ( jVp)
describe the value of being employed with tenure  at a rm which oers contract
w with expected (starting) payo Vp: 3 Similarly, let ( jVp) describe the rm’s
expected prot given a current employee with tenure  :
Theorem 1.
Fix an F satisfying A1 and a Vu  V . In the limit as dt ! 0 and for any
Vp 2 [V ; V ); the optimal contract w and corresponding worker and rm payos
fV ;g are solutions to the dierential equation system fw; V;g:
−u00(w)
u0(w)2
dw
dt
= F 0(V ); (6)
V − dV
dt
= u(w) + 
Z V
V
[x− V ]F 0(x)dx; (7)
[ + (1− F (V ))]− d
dt
= [p− w]; (8)
subject to the boundary conditions:
(a) limt!1fw(t); V (t);(t)g = (w; V ;); and
(b) the initial condition V (0) = Vp
Proof is in Appendix A.
A formal existence proof of an optimal contract is provided later (see the proof of
Theorem 2 below). For now, we provide the relevant insights.
3Note, that V ( jVp) is equivalent to V ( ; bw) when bw = w.
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Equations (7) and (8) are standard flow equations describing the continuation
payos V  and . For example, (7) follows directly from the Bellman equation
(3), while integration of (8) and boundary condition (a) (which implies boundedness)
gives
(tj:) =
Z 1
t
 ( ;w)
 (t;w)
[p− w( j:)]d (9)
which is simply the rm’s expected future prot given an employee with current
tenure t (where Appendix A establishes that T (w) = 1; a worker never quits into
unemployment).
The central economic insight is provided by (6) which describes how wages change
with tenure. As  > 0 and F 0 > 0 by assumption, wages are strictly increasing with
tenure and converge asymptotically to w. Given an employee with current expected
payo V = V ( j:); the density function F 0(V ) measures the number of rms whose
outside oer will marginally attract this worker. If there are no such rms, i.e.,
F 0(V ) = 0; marginally raising the worker’s wage w( j:) at tenure  has no marginal
eect on the worker’s quit rate at  . Optimal insurance then implies the rm pays
a (locally) constant wage. However as F 0(V ) > 0 by assumption, there is a trade-
o between increasing pay at tenure  , which reduces marginally the worker’s quit
rate at  , and worsening ex-ante income insurance. Indeed, integrating (6) over [0;  ]
implies
u0(w(0j:))
u0(w( j:)) = 1 + u
0(w(0j:))
Z 
0
F 0(V (tj:))(tj:)dt: (10)
By marginally increasing the wage paid at tenure  ; the rm reduces marginally the
worker’s quit rate over [0, ]: The integral term in (10) measures the rm’s overall
return to that decreased quit rate, which distorts the optimal wage contract away
from full insurance.
As is standard with moral hazard, the optimal contract rewards those who do not
quit - in this case the principal increases payments for those with higher tenure. Being
liquidity constrained new employees are potentially made worse o (as they cannot
borrow against future earnings), but the promise of higher earnings in the future
lowers their quit rate and increases joint surplus (where a quit is jointly inecient).
Of course, as wages increase with tenure, so does the value of employment V (tj:):
Further, as wages keep rising while V  < V ; there comes a point where V  equals (or is
at least very close to) V : But Claim 1 establishes the optimal contract for V = V , and
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so boundary condition (a) ensures that the limiting contract is optimal. Backward
induction using (6)-(8) then backs out the optimal transitional wage dynamics, where
the iteration stops at the point where V = Vp.
More formally, the optimal wage contract corresponds to the saddle path implied
by the dierential equations (6)-(8) and the stationary point (w; V ;):4 In fact, a
backward induction argument using A1 and Theorem 1 establishes that w( jVp)
and V ( jVp) are continuous and strictly increasing with  ; converging to w and V
respectively.
The above has characterized the wage contract a prot maximizing rm oers
its employees given the distribution of outside oers, and that it chooses to oer
new employees a starting payo Vp: Not surprisingly, it can be shown that the rm’s
expected payo per newly hired employee is strictly decreasing in Vp: Clearly, if this
were the only consideration, rms would choose the lowest Vp that is acceptable.
However, with on-the-job search, the greater the starting payo Vp oered by a rm,
the more workers it will attract:
The next section now determines F; the distribution of starting payos Vp; as part
of a non-cooperative wage contract posting game.
4 A Firm Replication
Throughout we focus on steady state and so dene the following steady-state vari-
ables. First consider steady state unemployment U . Strictly positive prot implies
V  Vu; and so each unemployed worker matches with the rst job oer received.
Also an optimal contract implies a worker never quits into unemployment. Hence
steady state unemployment satises (1− U) = U; and so
U =

 + 
;
while steady state employment is =( + ):
Now dene G(V ) as the steady-state probability a randomly selected employed
worker has current expected lifetime utility no greater than V: This distribution
function depends not only on F; but also on wage-tenure eects and quit turnover. As
we do not rule out mass points in G; use the notation G(V −)  lim">0;"!0G(V − "):
4note, equations (7),(8) have unstable forward looking roots.
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Now note that if the rm oers starting payo Vp  Vu; its steady state hiring
inflow, denoted h(Vp); is
h(Vp) = [

 + 
+

 + 
G(V −p )]
where Vp  Vu implies =( + ) is the rm’s inflow from the unemployment pool,
while 2G(V −p )=( + ) is the rm’s inflow from the pool of employed workers whose
current lifetime utility is strictly less than Vp:
Of course given an arbitrary contract bw which oers starting payo Vp; the rm’s
steady state prot flow is
(Vp) =
Z T ( bw)
0
[h (t; bw)dt][p− w(t)];
where h (t; bw)dt is the measure of employees with tenure t; and [p−w(t)] is the rm’s
prot flow given the wage paid to those workers. But given Vp and the corresponding
hiring inflow h; note that an optimal contract maximizes this flow payo; i.e. the
rm’s maximal steady state prot flow is
(Vp) = h(Vp)
Z 1
0
 (t;w)[p− w(t j Vp)]dt
= h(Vp)
(0jVp):
Denition: Given Vu, a replication is a distribution of optimal wage contracts
fw; V ;g; with corresponding steady state distributions F;G; and a flow prot
 > 0 where
(i) (Vp) =  for all Vp in the support of F ;
(ii) (Vp)   otherwise:
A replication requires that all rms make the same steady state prot flow  > 0 and
that any other wage contract results in lower prot.
The following establishes necessary conditions for a replication. The rst step in
accomplishing this task is to consider the wage contract of rms oering the lowest
value contract in the market; i.e., those rms that oer Vp = V :
Denition : Given an F satisfying A1, the baseline salary scale, denoted fws(t);
V s(t); s(t)g; is the solution to the dierential equations and boundary conditions
dened in Theorem 1 with Vp = V :
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Assumption A1 and the equations of Theorem 1 imply that ws(:) and V s(:) are
both continuous and strictly increasing functions which converge to w and V respec-
tively. Hence, given any other starting payo Vp 2 [V ; V ); a salary point tp  0 exists
where V s(tp) = Vp: Further, reflecting the saddle path property of the dierential
equations described in Theorem 1, optimality of ws implies that the optimal wage
contract given starting payo Vp = V
s(tp) corresponds to the wage tenure payments
ws(:) described for tenures t  tp.
This yields the convenient result that w(tjVp)  ws(t + tp); i.e. given starting
salary point tp an optimal wage contract pays a worker with tenure t a wage commen-
surate with point (tp+t) on the baseline salary scale. Such a worker then only quits if
oered a starting point t0p strictly greater than his/her current salary point. Note this
also implies the rm’s continuation payo can be written as (tjVp)  s(t+ tp):
Due to the argument made above, rather than consider rms as competing on
starting payos Vp, we consider instead rms competing on starting points tp on an
endogenously determined baseline salary scale. The least generous rms set tp = 0
and so oer wage contract fws(t)g1t=0 which implies starting payo Vp = V s(0)  V : A
rm oering a higher starting point tp > 0 oers a wage contract fws(tp+t)g1t=0 which
is the optimal wage contract given alternative starting payo Vp = V
s(tp) 2 (V ; V ]:
Dene F s(tp) as the distribution of starting points tp on the baseline salary scale
in a replication, and note that V s strictly increasing implies
F (V s(tp)) = F
s(tp):
Also note that A1 and the denition of the baseline salary scale imply dF s=dt =
F 0(V s)dV s=dt > 0 for all t > 0 and therefore F s has a connected support [0,1) and
is dierentiable for t > 0: Also by denition V s(0)  V and limt!1 V s(t) = V :
Similarly, the distribution of worker payos in a steady state, G(V ); can instead
be considered as a distribution of workers along the baseline salary scale: However, it
is mathematically convenient to dene 1−Gs(tp) as the measure of employed workers
on points t  tp on the baseline salary scale, so that Gs(tp) is the total measure of
those unemployed and those employed at a point strictly below tp:
In the rest of this study we consider a replication as a quintuple fws; V s;s; F s; Gsg
where:
(a) fws; V s;sg jointly describe the baseline salary scale,
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(b) F s describes the distribution of starting points tp oered by rms, and so w
s(tp+t)
and F s describes the distribution of wage contracts w(tj:), and
(c) Gs describes the distribution of workers across that salary scale.
The next three claims characterize each component in turn.
Claim 2. A replication satisfying A1 implies the baseline salary scale fws; V s;sg
satises the dierential equations
−u00(ws)
u0(ws)2
dws
dt
= s
dF s=dt
dV s=dt
; (11)
V s − dV
s
dt
= u(ws) + 
Z 1
t
[V s()− V s(t)]dF s(); (12)
f + [1− F s]gs − d
s
dt
= [p− ws]; (13)
for all t  0; and the boundary conditions
(a) limt!1(ws(t); V s(t);s(t)) = (w; V ;) where V = u(w)=; = [p− w]=;
(b) V s(0) = V :
Proof : Follows from the denition of the baseline salary scale and Theorem 1,
using F (V s) = F s; F 0(V s) = [dF s=dt]=[dV s=dt] (which exists by A1) and using the
transform x = V s() to establishZ V
V s(t)
[x− V s(t)]F 0(x)dx =
Z 1
t
[V s( )− V s(t)]dF s( ):
This completes the proof.
Next we compute steady state Gs:
Claim 3. A replication satisfying A1 implies
Gs(0) = =( + )
[ + [1− F s]]Gs + dG
s
dt
=  for t > 0: (14)
Proof: Note that the denition of Gs implies Gs(0) is equal to the number unem-
ployed, which in a (steady state) replication is =(+): The dierential equation for
Gs follows from standard steady state flow arguments which are provided in Appendix
B.
Finally we compute the steady state prot condition. As F s has connected support
[0;1); the constant prot condition requires
Gs(t)s(t) =  for all t  0
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where steady state implies Gs(t) is the hiring rate of a rm that oers starting
point t  0; i.e., it attracts all those workers who are not employed on a higher salary
point, and s(t) is the rm’s expected prot per worker by posting the corresponding
optimal wage contract.
Claim 4. A replication satisfying A1 implies:
(i) limt!1 F s(t) = 1 (i.e. there is no mass point in F at V );
(ii) limt!1Gs(t) = 1;
(iii)  = [p− w]= and so positive prot requires w < p and
Gs(t)s(t) = [p− w]= for all t  0: (15)
Proof in Appendix B.
Claims 2-4 establish the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 (Necessary Conditions for a Replication)
Necessary conditions for a replication satisfying A1 is a quintuple fws; V s;s; F s; Gsg
satisfying the four dierential equations (11)-(14), the constant prot condition (15),
the boundary conditions;
(a) limt!1(ws(t); V s(t);s(t); Gs(t); F s(t)) = (w; V ;; 1; 1) where w < p; V = u(w)=; =
[p− w]=;
(b) Gs(0) = =(+ );
where F s; Gs have the properties of distribution functions; i.e., are positive and
(strictly) increasing for all t  0; and F has the assumed properties A1 where F
satises F (V s) = F s for all t  0:
Identifying a solution to the conditions stated in Proposition 1 is relatively straight-
forward. First pick some arbitrary value for w satisfying w < p. Using the limit point
dened in boundary condition (a), the proof of Lemma A below shows we can iterate
the dierential equation system (11)-(15) backwards through time along the saddle
path. When Gs = =( + ) (should it occur), the iteration is stopped and time is
then renormalized so that t = 0 at this point. This ensures boundary condition (b)
is satised. As long as this path also implies F s; Gs are positive and increasing and
that the implied F has properties A1, we then have a candidate replication - a system
fws; V s;s; F s; Gsg which satises the conditions stated in Proposition 1. Formally,
we dene any such solution as a Candidate Replication and denote it as a quintuple
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fews; eV s; es; eF s; eGsg where, for example, ews(tjw) denotes the wage paid at point t on
the baseline salary scale in Candidate Replication w:
Lemma A. A Candidate Replication exists and is unique for any w 2 (w1; p) where
w1 = (+ 2)p=[+ ]
2 < p. A Candidate Replication does not exist for w < w1:
Proof in Appendix B.
This restriction on w (the highest wage in the market) is discussed in detail later.
w1 is a critical point where a Candidate Replication with initial value w < w1 does
not exist (it would require ws(0) < 0). From now on, we restrict attention to initial
values w 2 (w1; p):
Claim 5. A replication satisfying A1 and w 2 (w1; p) implies V = Vu:
Proof in Appendix B.
Claim 5 establishes that the rm oering the lowest value contract in the market
extracts full rents from the unemployed. This last Claim now allows us to fully
characterize a replication.
Proposition 2. (Characterization of a Replication)
Given Vu; necessary and sucient conditions for a replication satisfying A1 with
w 2 (w1; p) are those conditions described in Proposition 1 and the boundary condi-
tion
V s(0) = Vu:
Proof. Proposition 1 and Claims 2(b) and 5 establish that these conditions are
necessary. To see that they are sucient note that the constant prot condition (15)
(and w < p) ensures that all optimal contracts with payos Vp 2 [V ; V ] generate the
same payo  = [p− w]= > 0: Obviously a contract which oers Vp > V generates
less prot (it pays a higher wage wp > w and limt!1Gs(t) = 1 implies it attracts no
more workers than a contract oering w): Also any contract oering Vp < V = Vu
attracts no workers and so makes zero prot. Hence any solution to the conditions
stated must describe a replication.
Theorem 2 now establishes existence of a replication. However to simplify that
proof assume5
A2 :
R a
0
u(x)dx = −1 for any a > 0 (nite).
5otherwise we have to worry much more about the limiting properties of the equations described
in Proposition 1 as w ! w1 which implies ws(0)! 0:
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which with constant relative risk aversion would now require   2:
Theorem 2. (Existence of a Replication)
Given A2, a replication satisfying A1 exists for any Vu < u(p)=.
The proof is in Appendix B. It establishes that for any Vu < u(p)=; there exists a
w 2 (w1; p) where the corresponding Candidate Replication implies eV s(0 j w) = Vu:
This Candidate Replication then satises the conditions of Proposition 2 and so
describes a replication.
5 A Market Equilibrium
The previous section has described equilibrium rm behavior assuming the unem-
ployed have some value Vu to being unemployed. But if F describes the distribution
of job oers, then in the limit as dt! 0; optimal job search implies
Vu = u(b) + 
Z V
Vu
[x− Vu]dF (x): (16)
Of course, equilibrium requires that Vu must not only satisfy this job search condition,
but F must be consistent with a replication. Further we know that V s(0) = V = Vu
in any such replication: Hence by transforming variable x = V s(t); we can dene a
market equilibrium as follows.
Denition : A Market Equilibrium is a replication where Vu also satises
Vu = u(b) + 
Z 1
0
[V s(t)− Vu]dF s(t): (17)
(17) of course ties down Vu:
Theorem 3. (Existence of a Market Equilibrium)
Given A2, a Market Equilibrium satisfying A1 exists for any b 2 (0; p).
Proof in Appendix C:
The approach to identifying a Market Equilibrium is the same as for a replication.
Pick some arbitrary value w 2 (w1; p) and compute a Candidate Replication satisfying
the conditions given in Proposition 1. Now a replication requires V s(0) = V = Vu;
while (17) determines Vu. Hence a replication and a Market Equilibrium implies
V s(0) must satisfy
V s(0) = u(b) + 
Z 1
0
[V s(t)− V s(0)]dF s(t):
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The proof in Appendix C establishes that a w 2 (w1; p) exists where the corresponding
Candidate Replication satises this equilibrium criterion. This Candidate Replication
and Vu = eV s(0jw) then describes a Market Equilibrium.
6 Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 1
The proof takes four steps. Step 1 establishes that a rm always oers a contract
such that a worker never quits into unemployment, i.e., T (bw) = 1: Step 2 uses
a backward induction argument to characterize how wages change optimally with
tenure. Step 3 then identies the appropriate transversality condition; that wages
converge to w as tenure becomes large. Step 4 then computes the limiting solution
as dt! 0 and so establishes the Theorem.
Step 1. Fix dt > 0 satisfying dt < 1; an F satisfying A1 and Vu  V . Now choose
any Vp 2 [V ; V ) and let w = fw(tjVp)g1t=0 denote the optimal wage tenure contract.
As Vp is xed throughout this proof, simplify notation by subsuming reference to it
in w.
Given w; the Bellman equation (3) determines V (t;w): Let (t;w) denote the
rm’s expected prot given a worker with tenure t employed with wage contract w:
For t where V (t+ dt;w)  Vu; standard recursive arguments imply
(t;w) = [p− w(t)]dt+ (1− dt)[1− q(t+ dt;w)dt](t+ dt;w) (18)
where conditional on an outside oer, q(t+ dt;w)  1−F (V (t+ dt;w)) is the quit
probability of a worker with tenure t+ dt .
Now consider the optimal contract at tenure  ; where using an optimal quit strat-
egy, the worker obtains expected payo V ( ;w): Clearly optimality implies that the
wage payments w specied for tenures t   must maximize the rm’s continuation
payo ( ; bw) given V = V ( ;w): This insight implies the following Claim.
Claim A1 :
(i) For tenures   0 where V ( ;w)  V ; optimality implies V ( ;w)  Vu and
( ;w) > 0;
(ii) the constraint (5) binds; i.e., V (0;w) = Vp:
Proof is by contradiction arguments.
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(i) Suppose rst that V ( ;w) < Vu; in which case the worker quits and obtains
payo Vu while the rm obtains a zero payo. But this is dominated by oering
contract bw where w(t) = w for all t >  and w() = w satisfying [u(w)− u(w)]dt =
[Vu − V ]: In that case the worker obtains the same payo Vu and so does not quit
into unemployment, while w < p and Vu  V imply the rm makes strictly positive
prot, which contradicts the optimality of the original wage contract.
Suppose now that ( ;w)  0: As V ( ;w)  V by assumption, that supposedly
optimal contract is dominated by specifying w(t) = w for all t >  and w() = w
satisfying [u(w)− u(w)]dt = [V ( ;w)− V ] which makes strictly positive prot, and
hence contradicts ( ;w)  0.
(ii) If (5) is not binding, i.e. V (0;w) > Vp; then oering the same wage contract
but cutting the period zero wage to w where [u(w)− u(w(0))]dt = [Vp − V (0;w)]
is strictly prot increasing (it satises (5)), does not aect the worker’s quit strategy
and strictly reduces total wages which is the required contradiction. This completes
the proof of Claim A1.
Claim A1(i) establishes two facts. First, V (t;w)  Vu for all t and so T (w) =1;
the worker never quits into unemployment: Second, the liquidity constraint is never
binding; i.e. w(t) > 0 for all t (otherwise dt > 0 and w(t) = 0 implies V (t;w) =
−1 < u(b)=  Vu):
Step 2. Assume an optimal contract w exists and x some tenure date   0: Now
consider an alternative wage contract, denoted w = fw(t)g1t=0; which is dened by:
(i) w(t) = w(t) for all t 6=  ;  + dt
(ii) w() = w( ) + dx and w( + dt) = w( + dt) + dy
where (dx; dy) are arbitrarily small and satisfy
u0(w( ))dx+ (1− dt)[1− q( + dt;w)dt]u0(w( + dt))dy = 0: (19)
Note, this perturbation implies w changes wages at just two tenure dates  ;  + dt:
Also note that as the liquidity constraint is never binding on w; this variation is
always feasible as long as (dx; dy) are small enough .
Dene dV (t) = V (t;w)−V (t;w) which is the increase in the employee’s expected
payo at tenure t given this contract perturbation: For dy arbitrarily small, backward
induction now implies
dV ( + dt) = u0(w( + dt))dydt: (20)
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and dV (t) = 0 for all other t: This occurs because w = w for all tenures t >  + dt
and so dV (t) = 0 for those t: As V ( + 2dt;w) = V ( + 2dt); (20) then follows from
the Bellman equation describing V ( + dt; bw): Note that a wage increase dy > 0 at
tenure date  + dt implies the worker is better o at this tenure date: But (19) then
compensates by choosing dx so that V ( ;w ) = V ( ;w) (use the Bellman equation
for V ( ; bw) and the Envelope Theorem). Backward induction then implies dV (t) = 0
for t   : Most importantly, note that V (0;w) = V (0;w) and so w satises (5).
Hence a necessary condition for optimality of w is that any such contract variation
cannot be prot increasing.
Claim A1 implies the rm’s continuation payo at tenure  satises (18) above.
Now let d() = ( ;w) − ( ;w) denote the increase in the rm’s continuation
payo implied by the perturbed contract w : As ( + 2dt;w) = ( + 2dt;w); it
follows using (18) that for dy arbitrarily small, the rst order eect of this contract
perturbation is
d() = −dxdt− (1− dt)[1− q( + dt;w)dt]dydt
+(1− dt)dt[−dq( + dt)]( + dt;w)
where dq( + dt) = q( + dt;w )− q( + dt;w) denotes the change in the worker’s
quit probability at tenure +dt: Note, the rst two terms are the direct wage costs of
this perturbation, while the last term is the increase in expected prot by changing
the worker’s quit probability at tenure  + dt:
We now solve for d(): The denition of dq implies
dq( + dt) = [1− F (V ( + dt;w)]− [1− F (V ( + dt;w)]:
Hence F dierentiable and dy arbitrarily small imply
dq( + dt) = −F 0(V ( + dt;w))dV ( + dt);
where dV is given by (20). Using this and (19) to substitute out dx give:
d() = dydt(1− dt)[[1− q( + dt;w)dt][u
0(w( + dt))
u0(w( ))
− 1]
+dtF 0(V ( + dt;w)u0(w( + dt))( + dt;w)]
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But dy ? 0 and so optimality of the wage contract requires d() = 0: Hence a
necessary condition for optimality is
(1− q( + dt;w)dt)

1− u
0(w( + dt))
u0(w())

(21)
= dtF 0(V ( + dt;w))u0(w( + dt)( + dt;w)
and we have established the following Claim.
Claim A2. Given dt > 0 satisfying dt < 1; the optimal wage contract satises (21)
for all  ; which implies
(i) if V (t+ dt;w) < V then w()  w( + dt)
(ii) if V (t+ dt;w) > V then w() = w( + dt):
Proof : Implications (i) and (ii) follow directly from (21) given assumption A1 and
 > 0 (Claim A1(i)).
Note, Claim A2 implies w increases with tenure, and so V ( ;w) is also increasing
with tenure. This also implies V ( ;w)  V (0;w) = Vp  V  Vu for all   0:
Step 3: We now use forward induction to obtain the appropriate transversality
condition.
Claim A3. Optimality implies
lim
!1
w() = w; and lim
!1
V ( ) = V
Proof: Consider any   0 where V ( ;w)  V : A contradiction argument using
Claim A2 implies V ( + dt;w)  V .6 As Claim A1(ii) implies V (0;w) = Vp < V ;
forward induction now implies V ( ;w)  V for all  :
Monotonicity of w now requires w()  w for all  [otherwise V (t;w) > V for
t large enough, which contradicts the previous paragraph]. Hence w must converge
to some limit point w1  w as t ! 1: Finally, a contradiction argument using A1
implies w1 = w which completes the proof of the Claim.7
6Suppose instead V ( + dt;w) > V . But Claim 1 in the text then implies w(t) = wp for all
t   + dt; where u(wp) = V ( + dt;w): Claim A2(ii) then implies w( ) = w( + dt) and so
V ( ;w) = V ( + dt;w) > V which is the required contradiction.
7Suppose not, and so limt!1w(t) = w1 < w: Let V1 = limt!1 V (t;w); 1 =
limt!1 (t;w): Note that w1 < w implies V1 < V ; and Claim A1(i) then implies 1 > 0:
But assumption A1 implies F 0 > 0 at V = V1: Hence given dt > 0; (21) implies w(t)− w(t+ dt)
is bounded away from zero as t!1, which is the required contradiction.
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Step 4. Steps 1 and 2 characterize the optimal contract for any dt > 0 satisfying
dt < 1: Note that (21) can be written as
1− q( + dt;w)dt
u0(w( ))u0(w( + dt)

u0(w( ))− u0(w( + dt))
dt

= F 0(V ( + dt;w))( + dt;w)
Hence the limiting solution as dt ! 0 implies the dierential equation given in the
Theorem, where the dierential equations for V and  follow from (3) and (18).
Claim A3 implies the boundary condition (a), and Claim A1(ii) establishes the initial
condition (b).
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
7 Appendix B.
Proof of Claim 3.
Vu  V implies all unemployed workers accept the rst job oer they receive.
Hence steady state unemployment U must satisfy [1 − U ] = U; which implies
U = =( + ): As 1− Gs(0) is the steady state measure of employed workers (with
salary points t  0) then Gs(0) = U:
Now pick any point t > 0 on the baseline salary scale. As F s is continuous for all
t > 0 (A1 implies it is dierentiable) then over any arbitrarily small time interval ";
steady state implies
"(1−Gs(t)) = [Gs(t)−Gs(t− ")] +Gs(t− ")"(1− F s(t)) + 0("2);
where the LHS is the flow out workers in the set of employed workers with salary
point no lower than t; and the RHS is the flow in, which includes those whose tenure
increases suciently over time period ", those who receive outside oers with starting
point no lower than t;and the 0("2) term captures those who receive outside oers
in the interval [t − "; t) and whose tenure increases suciently within this " period
that they rise above the t threshold. Letting " ! 0 implies Gs is continuous; while
dividing by " and rearranging, this limit then implies the dierential equation stated
in the Claim.
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Proof of Claim 4.
We rst establish that a replication implies there is no mass point in F at V .
Suppose instead that a mass point exists in F at V : Then Claim 1 implies there is
also a mass point in G at V (as all such employees receive V forever), which we denote
by m > 0. Hence for any t <1; 1−Gs(t)  m; and so limt!1Gs(t)  1−m: As the
denition of the baseline salary scale implies limt!1s(t) = ; then the constant
prot condition, which requires  = Gs(t)s(t) for all t > 0 implies   [1−m]:
Of course  > 0 in a replication requires  > 0 and w < p:
Now consider the deviating contract bw = fw+ "g1t=0 where " > 0: Claim 1 implies
this contract oers starting payo Vp = u(w + ")= > V which implies hiring rate :
Further Claim 1 implies per worker prot of −"=; and so bw generates steady state
flow prot [ − "=]: Clearly given m > 0; " small enough implies this prot flow
exceeds  which contradicts the denition of a replication.
No mass point in F at V and the denition of F s now implies (a). (b) then follows
from (a) and Claim 3 [with limt!1 dGs=dt = 0]. As F s has connected support [0;1);
then  = limt!1[Gs(t)s(t)] which implies (c).
Proof of Lemma A.
The proof is by construction - we x some w < p and starting at the limiting point
described in boundary condition (a), iterate the dierential equations described in
Proposition 1 backwards through time. But rst simplify those conditions as follows.
Claim B1. The conditions of Proposition 1 imply
Gs(t) =

p− w
p− ws(t)
 1
2
;s(t) =
p− w
Gs(t)
:
Proof. Substitute out s using the constant prot condition (15) in (13). Using
(14) to substitute out dGs=dt in the resulting expression implies the above solution
for Gs: s then follows from (15):
We can use Claim B1 to substitute outGs;s in the conditions described in Propo-
sition 1 and so reduce that system to a dierential equation system for fws; V s; F sg.
However, notice that V s described by (12) contains an integral term. To obtain a
system of autonomous rst order dierential equations, dene the surplus function
S(t) =
Z 1
=t
[V s()− V s(t)]dF s( );
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and note that it is the solution to the dierential equation
dS
dt
= −[1− F s]dV
s
dt
;
subject to the boundary condition limt!1 S(t) = 0:
Proposition 2 (A Reduced Form Characterization of a Replication).
A Candidate Replication with w < p is described by a sextuple
fws; V s;s; F s; Gs; Sg where
(I) fws; V s; F s; Sg satisfy
dws
dt
= 

p− ws
p− w
 1
2
− [ + [1− F s]]; (22)
dV s
dt
= −u(ws)− S + V s; (23)
dF s
dt
=
−u00(ws)
u0(ws)2[p− w] 12 [p− ws] 12
dws
dt
dV s
dt
; (24)
dS
dt
= −[1− F s]dV
s
dt
; (25)
subject to the boundary conditions
(a) limt!1(ws(t); V s(t); F s(t); S(t)) = (w; V ; 1; 0) where V = u(w)=;
(b) [ p−w
p−ws(0) ]
1=2 = =(+ );
(II) fGs;sg are given by Claim B1, and
(III) F s; Gs are positive and strictly increasing for all t  0:
Note Claim B1 implies that boundary condition (b) for Gs(0) dened in Propo-
sition 1 now denes a boundary condition for ws(0): Establishing Lemma A reduces
to showing a solution exists to the conditions given in Proposition 2.
First consider boundary condition (b) in Proposition 2. Given w1 dened in the
Lemma, straightforward algebra establishes that w < w1 requires w
s(0) < 0 which
cannot be part of a replication.
Now x a w 2 (w1; p) and dene w0 = w0(w) where p−w0 = (+)2(p−w)=2 (and
note this implies w0 2 (0; w)): Also note that boundary condition (b) in Proposition
2 is satised if and only if ws(0) = w0: We now use backward induction to show a
solution exists to the conditions of Proposition 2.
First note that the limiting point (w; V ; 1; 0) is a stationary point of the system
(22)-(25). Standard stability analysis implies this stationary point has one stable
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root, one unstable root and two degenerate roots. The eigenvectors for that system
imply a convergent saddle path exists with limiting solution:
ews = w + A1e−γteV s = u(w)

+
u0(w)[p− w]
[p− w + 0:5]A1e
−γt
eF s = 1eS = 0;
where γ = 0:5=[p−w] > 0: Note, the degenerate roots allow a continuum of potential
steady states (which we are essentially indexing by w):8
Given the limiting solution for this saddle path (with A1 < 0; which implies
dws=dt > 0 for t large enough), we now use backward induction on the system
(22)-(25). Obviously as equations (22)-(25) are continuous in (ws; V s; F s; S) (while
ws > 0) a solution always exists while ws > 0. The issue is whether the saddle path
that is traced out satises the conditions of Proposition 2.
Claim B2. The saddle path implied by the conditions of Proposition 2 implies
dws=dt > 0 while ws(t) > 0:
Proof by contradiction. As dws=dt > 0 for t large enough [along the saddle path],
then if Claim B2 fails, there must exist some t0 where w
s(t0) > 0 and dw
s=dt = 0;
and dws=dt > 0 for all t > t0: Furthermore, as wages are ever increasing for t > t0,
this implies dV s=dt  0 for all t  t0 and V s(t0) > u(ws(t0))=: We now argue to a
contradiction.
Dierentiating (22) with respect to t and using (24) implies,
::
ws
:
ws
=

(p− w)1=2(p− ws)1=2

−1
2
+
−u00(ws)
[u0(ws)]2

:
V s

which can be integrated as
lnws(t0) = lnw
s(T )
+
Z T
t0

(p− w)1=2(p− ws)1=2

1
2
− −u
00(ws)
[u0(ws)]2
dV s
dt

dt
Now given ws(t0) > 0; let
B0 = max
ws(t0)xw
−u00(x)
[u0(x)]2

8The second degenerate root implies a root which is of order t and so is asymptotically unstable.
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and note that u(x) strictly increasing and twice dierentiable for x > 0 implies
0 < B0 <1: The above now implies
lnws(t0)  lnws(T ) + 0:5(T − t0)
(p− w)1=2(p− ws(t0))1=2 −
B0[V − u(ws(t0))]
(p− w)
But choosing any T satisfying t0 < T <1 implies the RHS is greater than -1; and
so
:
ws (t0) > 0 which is the required contradiction.
A simple contradiction argument also implies the saddle path must imply a so-
lution to ws(t) = w0 exists. Suppose instead while iterating backwards, the saddle
path converges to some wc 2 (w0; w); i.e. it never reaches w0 > 0: But as t ! −1;
the above inequality implies
lnws(t)  lnws(T ) + 0:5(T − t)
(p− w)1=2(p− wc)1=2 −
B0[V − u(wc)]
(p− w)
and so ws(t) becomes arbitrarily large, which is the required contradiction. Hence
there exists some point in time where the saddle path implies ws = w0: By renormal-
izing time to t = 0 at that point we satisfy boundary condition (b).
All that remains to show is that this solution satises part (III) in Proposition 2.
Now ws is strictly increasing over time and converges to w [Claim B2] and so Gs given
in Claim B1 implies Gs satises (III). Also dws=dt > 0 and dV s=dt > 0 everywhere
along the saddle path, and so (24) implies F s is also strictly increasing. Further at
t = 0; (22) and ws(0) = w0 imply
F s(0) =
1

dws(0)
dt
> 0:
and so F s satises (III). Note, there is a mass point at t = 0: Hence, given w 2
(w1; p); a solution exists to the conditions of Proposition 2, which therefore describes
a Candidate Replication.
Proof of Claim 5.
Claim 4 implies  = Gs(0)s(0) in a replication, and so Claims 3 and 4 imply
s(0) = (+)[p−w]=2: w > w1 and the denition of w1 now imply s(0) < p=(+):
Also note that a replication must also be a Candidate Replication, and the
proof of Lemma A establishes that w > w1 implies w
s(0) > 0:
Given the above facts, we now prove Claim 5 using a contradiction argument.
Suppose Claim 5 is not true, and so Claim 3 implies Vu < V : Now consider the
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deviating contract w" = fw(t)g1t=0 where for some " > 0 (small), w" makes the
following wage payments:
w(t) = w0 for all 0  t < "
w(t) = ws(t− ") for all t  "
where w0 satises 0 < w0 < min[w
s(0); p=( + ) − s(0)]: Note the rst paragraph
implies such a w0 exists.
Clearly at tenure  = " this contract w" coincides with the baseline salary scale,
and so V (";w") = V s(0) = V and (";w") = s(0): Most importantly, V s(0) > Vu;
by assumption, and w0 > 0 now guarantee V (0;w
")  Vu for " small enough. Hence
contract w" will continue to attract the unemployed for " small enough; though during
the early low wage phase workers will quit at rate  [as w0 < w
s(0)]:
Note that the rm’s continuation payo (t;w") satises (8) in Theorem 1. As
(";w") = s(0); then at t = "−;
d
dt
= [ + ]s(0)− [p− w0]:
But the above choice of w0 implies d=dt < 0 and so for " small enough (0;w
") >
s(0): However, as this contract implies the same hiring rate as one oering Vp =
V s(0) (both only attract the unemployed) this deviating contract generates greater
steady state prot which contradicts the denition of a replication.
Proof of Theorem 2.
Establishing the existence of a replication requires nding a w 2 (w1; p) and cor-
responding Candidate Replication which satises the additional boundary conditioneV s(0jw) = Vu:
Recall that the proof of Lemma A establishes that for any w 2 (w1; p); a Candidate
Replication exists. Further, that solution corresponds to the saddle path to the
dierential equations described in proposition 2, where the saddle path implies w =ews(tjw) is strictly increasing in t: Given that, it is now helpful to re-parameterize the
saddle path as follows.
Given the baseline salary scale w = ews(tjw) (which exists) dene the inverse
function (wjw) = ( ews)−1(wjw) which is the salary point at which a worker is paid
wage w on the baseline salary scale [in that Candidate Replication]. Given a worker
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is currently receiving wage w; a Candidate Replication then implies the worker’s
expected payo, denoted V e(wjw);is given by
V e(wjw) = eV s( (wjw)jw):
Similarly we can dene F e(wjw) = eF s((:)jw); and Se(wjw) = eS( (:)jw):
This allows us to describe the saddle path in w-space. In particular, as a candidate
replication implies eV s(tj:)  V e( ews(tj:)j:) we obtain
dV e
dw
=
deV s=dt
dews=dt
and similarly for dF e=dw; dSe=dw:Hence, we can rewrite the conditions of Proposition
2 as follows.
Proposition 3.
Given w 2 (w1; p); a Candidate Replication implies a baseline salary scale ews(tjw)
and a triple fV e; F e; Seg satisfying
dV e
dw
=
−u(w)− Se + V e

h
p−w
p−w
i1=2
− [ + (1− F e)]
; (26)
dF e
dw
=
−u00(w)
u0(w)2

[−u(w)− Se + V e]
[p− w]1=2[p− w]1=2 ; (27)
dSe
dw
= −[1− F e]dV
e
dw
; (28)
and the boundary conditions
(a) (V e; F e; Se) = (V ; 1; 0) at w = w; and
(b) dV e=dw = u0(w)[p− w]=[(p− w + 0:5)] at w = w.
Proof The dierential equations follow directly from Proposition 2 and the denitions
of fV e; F e; Seg. However, note that the initial conditions imply (26) is not well dened
at w = w. Instead the value of dV e=dw (which is given in (b)) is determined by the
eigenvectors associated with the saddle path at the limiting steady state (as described
in the Proof of Lemma A).
This Proposition transforms the dynamical system describing a Candidate Repli-
cation to an initial value problem. Given starting values (V ; 1; 0) at w = w, iterate
these dierential equations backwards with w; stopping at w = w0 where w0 = w0(w)
28
as previously dened. Most importantly, we know that the Candidate Replication im-
plies ews(0jw) = w0: Hence by denition of V e; the boundary condition eV s(0jw) = Vu
is satised if and only if V e(w0jw) = Vu: Establishing Theorem 2 simply requires es-
tablishing that a w 2 (w1; p) exists where V e(w0jw) = Vu: The Candidate Replication
with that particular value of w then denes a Replication.
Claim B3.
The conditions of Proposition 3 imply V e(w0(w) j w) is continuous in w for all
w 2 (w1; p);and assumption A2 implies,
(i) limw!w+1 V
e(w0jw) = −1;and
(ii) limw!p− V e(w0jw) = u(p)=:
The proof is relegated to Appendix C which considers the properties of the dierential
equation system dened in Proposition 3 in detail. However given any Vu < u(p)=;
Claim B3 now implies there exists w 2 (w1; p) where V e(w0jw) = Vu: Hence for
that value of w; the corresponding Candidate Replication denes a replication which
completes the proof of Theorem 2.
8 Appendix C.
This Appendix focuses on the properties of the dierential equation system dened
in Proposition 3 in Appendix B, which we quickly restate.
Given w 2 (w1; p); a Candidate Replication implies a baseline salary scale ews(t j
w) and a triple fV e; F e; Seg satisfying
dV e
dw
=
−u(w)− Se + V e

h
p−w
p−w
i1=2
− [ + (1− F e)]
; (29)
dF e
dw
=
−u00(w)
u0(w)2

[−u(w)− Se + V e]
[p− w]1=2[p− w]1=2 ; (30)
dSe
dw
= −[1− F e]dV
e
dw
; (31)
subject to the boundary conditions
(BC1) (V e; F e; Se) = (V ; 1; 0) at w = w; and
(BC2) dV e=dw = u0(w)[p− w]=[(p− w + 0:5)] at w = w.
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Note that ews strictly increasing and (22) imply the denominator in (29) is strictly
positive for all w < w (along the solution path).
Proof of Claim B3. We prove each part of Claim B3 in turn.
Step 1. To prove V e(w0(w)jw) is continuous for all w 2 (w1; p) we rst establish the
following Claim.
Claim C1. For any w 2 (0; w); V e(wjw) is continuous in w
Proof. Consider the Candidate Replication given w: Then for w = w − "; where
" > 0 but small, the boundary conditions (BC1),(BC2) imply
V e(w − "jw) = u(w)

− "u0(w)[p− w]=[(p− w + 0:5)] + o(")
F e(w − "jw) = 1− o("); Se(w − "jw) = o(")
where o(") describes the residual term which has the property lim"!0[o(")="] = 0:
Now for w  w − "; dene V "(w) = V e(wjw) − V e(wjw − ") which describes
the distance between these two trajectories at any point w: Similarly dene F "(w);
S"(w): The above establishes that V "(w − ") = 0("); while F "(w − ") = o(");
S"(w − ") = o("); i.e., these trajectories are initially arbitrarily close to each other
at w = w − ".
Now use backward iteration. Along the saddle path (in any Candidate Replica-
tion) Lemma A establishes that dws=dt > 0, and so (22) implies [(p−w)=(p−w)]1=2−
[+]+F e > 0 for all w < w: Hence, for any w 2 (0; w−"]; the dierential equation
system (26)-(28) describing V e; F e; Se is continuously dierentiable in w; V e; F e; Se.
Hence starting at w = w − " implies
d
dw
[V "] =
dV e(wjw)
dw
− dV
e(wjw − ")
dw
= 0(");
and similarly for F ";S"; i.e. the trajectories separate very slowly with w: Back-
ward iteration and integration now imply V "(w);F "(w);S"(w) remain 0(") while
w > 0 (i.e., the paths remain close together over any bounded interval [w;w−"]). Of
course, V "(w) = 0(") establishes Claim C1.
The following corollary establishes Step 1.
Corollary of Claim C1. V e(w0(w)jw) is continuous in w for all w 2 (w1; p):
Proof. The denition of w0 implies w0(w − ") = w0(w)− "( + )2=2 > 0. As the
dierential equations in Proposition 3 are continuously dierentiable in w for w > 0
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[along the saddle path]; then for " small enough
V e(w0(w − ")jw − ") = V e(w0(w)jw − ") + 0(")
and Claim C1 now establishes the corollary.
Step 2.
lim
w!p
V e(w0jw) = u(p)=:
Proof As this limit also implies w0 ! p; then ws(t) 2 [w0; p] for all t in any Candidate
Replication implies all wages paid are arbitrarily close to p:
Step 3.
lim
w!w1
V e(w0jw) = −1:
Proof Fix a w 2 (w1; p) and dene
(wjw) = V e(wjw)− u(w)− Se(wjw): (32)
Dierentiating (32) with respect to w and using (26) and (28) implies:
r(wjw)− d
dw
= u0(w); (33)
where
r(wjw) =  + (1− F
e)

h
p−w
p−w
i1=2
− [ + (1− F e)]
:
As the denition of  implies  = 0 at w = w; integrating (33) implies
(wjw) =
Z w
w
e−
R y
w r(xjw)dxu0(y)dy:
Furthermore, as
R w
w
r(xjw)dx =1; 9 integration by parts implies
(wjw) =
Z w
w
r(yjw)e−
R y
w r(xjw)dx[u(y)− u(w)]dy:
9Dene transformation x = ws(t) and note thatZ w
w
r(x j w)dx =
Z 1

[ + (1− F s(t))]dt:
Also note this implies Z w
w
r(y j w)e−
R
y
w
r(xjw)dxdy = 1:
31
Hence putting w = w0; (32) implies:
V e(w0jw) =
Z w
w0
r(wjw)e−
R w
w0
r(xjw)dx
[u(w)− u(w0)]dw
+u(w0) + S
e(w0jw)
and as
R w
w0
r(wjw)e−
R w
w0
r(xjw)dx
dw = 1; this reduces to
V e(w0jw) =
Z w
w0
r(wjw)e−
R w
w0
r(xjw)dx
u(w)dw + Se(w0jw) (34)
Now the denition of S in the text [and transform w = ews(t j w)] implies
Se(w0jw) =
Z w
w0
[V e(wjw)− V e(w0jw)]dF e(wjw)
 [V − V e(w0jw)];
and so using this equation in (34) and re-arranging gives
(+ )[V e(w0jw)− V ] 
Z w
w0
r(wjw)e−
R w
w0
r(xjw)dx
[u(w)− u(w)]dw:
Note that the integral on the RHS is a weighted average of [u(w)−u(w)]; where these
weights necessarily add up to one. Further, this integral increases as we reduce r(wj:)
for any w < w (reducing r(wj:) reduces the weight on u(w) and increases it on all
u(w0) > u(w)): Furthermore, the denition of r implies
r  
[p−w0
p−w ]
1=2 − 
and the denition of w0 now implies r(w j w)  =: Hence
(+ )[V e(w0jw)− V ] 
Z w
w0


e−


[w−w0][u(w)− u(w)]dw
 

e−
[w−w0]

Z w
w0
[u(w)− u(w)]dw
Finally, assumption A2, thatZ a
0
u(w)dw = −1 for any a > 0
now implies V e(w0 j w)! −1 as w ! w1; w0 ! 0:
This completes the proof of Claim B3.
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Proof of Theorem 3. Identifying a Market Equilibrium requires nding a w 2
(w1; p) and a Candidate Replication so that (17) is satised. Given the denitions of
V e; F e; Se in the proof of Theorem 2, such a xed point requires nding a w where
Vu = u(b) + 
Z V
Vu
[V e(wjw)− Vu]dF e(wjw): (35)
Claim B4. A Market Equilibrium exists if and only if a w 2 (w1; p) exists which
satises
u(b) =
Z w
w0
r(wjw)e−
R w
w0
r(xjw)dx
u(w)dw (36)
where r is dened in the Proof of Claim B3.
Proof. As a replication requires V e(w0jw) = Vu; (35) for a Market Equilibrium
implies
V e(w0jw) = u(b) + 
Z V
V e(w0jw)
[V e(wjw)− V e(w0jw)]dF e(wjw)
= u(b) + Se(w0jw)
by denition of S: Claim B4 now follows from (34) in the Proof of Claim B3.
Given this condition for w; we now use the arguments demonstrated in the proof
of claim B3. In particular, the proof of claim B3 (Step 3) establishes that the RHS
of (36) is a weighted average of u(w); where those weights integrate up to one, and
which shift as w changes value. The proof of Claim B3 (Step 1) implies this integral
is a continuous function of w: The proof of claim B3 (Step 2) implies this integral
limits to u(p) as w ! p− (as this also implies w0 ! p−): Conversely w ! w+1 implies
w0 ! 0+ and given assumption A2, the proof of Claim B3 (Step 3) implies this
integral goes to -1: Hence for any b 2 (0; p); a w 2 (w1; p) exists which satises (36).
Given that value for w, a Market Equilibrium then exists with the corresponding
Candidate Replication and Vu = V
e(w0jw):
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